tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post6696027354441283904..comments2023-04-21T20:55:22.881-04:00Comments on It's Only A Theory: Analytic Metaphysics and MethodologyGabriele Contessahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comBlogger57125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-22175668302536226362009-03-22T14:24:00.000-04:002009-03-22T14:24:00.000-04:00Gabriele,My original post was about the fact that ...Gabriele,<BR/><BR/>My original post was about the fact that Carnap was not in the list and Lewis was. I take that to say something about the state of contemporary philosophy. I was not endorsing the idea of arguments about exactly who are the ten best philosophers but making an observation about the list that had been produced. I then found it ironic that you should point out to me that philosophy of science is not as central to philosophy as it was in the days of Carnap because that was exactly my point. I say that this is not because Carnap has become less important but because philosophy has taken an a priori and inward-looking turn. Certainly, anyone who thinks that Carnap was one of the very greatest and most important philosophers of the twentieth century will be inclined to seek some explanation of the fact that he did not figure in the top ten.<BR/><BR/>To clarify I don't think philosophy or science has anything to gain from the debate about unrestricted composition.<BR/><BR/>I may be on record discussing metaphysical questions but that hardly shows that I do not disagree with many metaphysicians about aims and methods. It cannot because I do so disagree.<BR/><BR/>The analogy with Carnap and Heidegger is that if someone rejects the worth of a certain kind of philosophy then telling them to engage with it constructively is to miss their point. Why would I want to engage constructively in debates I think are pointless?<BR/> <BR/>There is a difference between paying lip-service to the idea of taking science seriously and actually doing so. And some metaphysicians do say that it is irrelevant what science says because certain questions can be answered a priori.James Ladymanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18193668750711491266noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-32281955227366424012009-03-22T09:59:00.000-04:002009-03-22T09:59:00.000-04:00PS I don't see how what I am saying is analogous t...PS I don't see how what I am saying is analogous to saying that Carnap should have engaged more with Heidegger. The two did not agree on either the aims of philosophy or its methods. My argument is that you clearly agree on the aim of philosophy with metaphysicians (you are on record discussing the some clearly metaphysical questions) and you still haven't explained clearly where your profound methodological differences with them lie--you only said that they should take our best scientific theories seriously, which most metaphysicians would agree. So, I don't see the analogy.Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-8002723179458263282009-03-22T09:49:00.000-04:002009-03-22T09:49:00.000-04:00James,"it is ironic that in your last comment you ...James,<BR/><BR/><I>"it is ironic that in your last comment you bemoan the fact that philosophers of science have less impact that the likes of Carnap, Neurath, Popper, Hempel, and Quine. You will recall that my original post was indeed complaining that Lewis appeared in a list of the greatest philosophers of C20 but Carnap did not."</I><BR/><BR/>I don't see what's ironic about that. <I>I</I> wasn't saying that those philosophers are better or worse philosophers than Lewis. It is you who were implying that Lewis is worse than them. I find the whole Top 100 Philosophers of the 20th Centruy exercise pointless and a bit silly. I take philosophy to be about theses and arguments in their support not about the people that put them forward.<BR/><BR/><I>"Science has nothing to gain from the debate about unrestricted composition because there is no knowledge of the world in this domain, whereas science does embody knowledge about cognition and the nature of matter."</I><BR/><BR/>Science may have nothing to gain but philosophy seem to have a lot to gain and, since you self-identify as a philosopher, I find it peculiar that you seem only concerned with what science has to gain from it and not at all about what philosophy has to gain from it. (If you were a biologist, wouldn't it sound weird if you criticized an area of biology by saying that physics has notthing to gain from it?)<BR/><BR/><I>"I don't think it is a good idea for moral and political philosophers to ignore moral psychology or history and that would be the equivalent of the excesses of a priorism in metaphysics." </I><BR/><BR/>That's beside the point--I think you agree that no amount of empirical evidence about our moral psychology or history can settle <I>normative</I> questions in ethics and political philosophy.Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-21827117985311760172009-03-22T05:45:00.000-04:002009-03-22T05:45:00.000-04:00Gabriele it is ironic that in your last comment yo...Gabriele it is ironic that in your last comment you bemoan the fact that philosophers of science have less impact that the likes of Carnap, Neurath, Popper, Hempel, and Quine. You will recall that my original post was indeed complaining that Lewis appeared in a list of the greatest philosophers of C20 but Carnap did not. I agree therefore that philosophy of science is not as central to the discipline as it was and that is what I am complaining about. I am asking why so many philosophers are trying to answer epistemological and metaphysical questions more or less a priori, and not paying attention to the relevant science. You say that philosophy of science needs to engage more with metaphysics and epistemology, and I say that metaphysicians and epistemologists need to engage more with science and philosophy of science. There is a very good reason why it should be the latter way round. Science has nothing to gain from the debate about unrestricted composition because there is no knowledge of the world in this domain, whereas science does embody knowledge about cognition and the nature of matter.<BR/><BR/>You think that we should engage with metaphysics and epistemology in a 'critical but constructive manner' but you neglect the fact that someone who believes that a particular set of theoretical and methodological assumptions are wrong and bad for a discipline has no choice but to try and undermine them. I have no interest in engaging 'constructively' with many debates in metaphysics because I think that the debates are largely sterile and pointless. Would you tell Carnap he should have engaged more constructively with Heidegger?<BR/><BR/>In general, you seem quite worried about my disdain and dismissive attitude but I am just one person with a strong view. Plenty of other people are much more moderate and restrained in what they say (publicly anyway).<BR/><BR/>I am not going to respond to the point about ethics in detail. I am not an expert in ethics and have thought little about their methodology but I don't think it is a good idea for moral and political philosophers to ignore moral psychology or history and that would be the equivalent of the excesses of a priorism in metaphysics. In general I think philosophers should look outwards not inwards. The great philosophers were on the whole not professional philosophers with scant knowledge of anything else.James Ladymanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18193668750711491266noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-70503336218673605472009-03-21T21:29:00.000-04:002009-03-21T21:29:00.000-04:00James,"I really don't think philosophers of scienc...James,<BR/><BR/><I>"I really don't think philosophers of science should refrain from criticizing what they sincerely believe to be a deleterious trend in philosophy because that might make it harder for other philosophers of science to get jobs"</I><BR/><BR/>I agree, but that can hardly be considered my main argument.<BR/><BR/><I>"Various of your posts suggest that your view is that philosophers of science need to engage with analytic metaphysics because the practitioners of the latter are important and powerful in the subject and we don't want to upset them."</I><BR/><BR/>I don't know where you got this impression from. What I have said is that at the moment analytic metaphysics is thriving and the same cannot be said of general philosophy of science. So, I think if we think that the views and arguments of analytic metaphysicians are not supported by or are even inconsistent with our best scientific theories, we should argue for that, not dismiss analytic metaphysics on the basis of some alleged difference in aims and/or method.<BR/><BR/><I>"You imply that naturalistically inclined philosophers such as myself are in denial about the fact that we are philosophers employed in philosophy departments not scientists. You offer no evidence for this insight. I attend my department's seminars on ethics and political philosophy and retain a strong interest in all areas of the subject and its history as I said in my original post. I have contributed to the teaching of many area of the subject including giving lectures on Descartes. Your allegation is way off. It is because I self identify as a philosopher that I care so much about how the subject develops. Please let's stick to the issues and not speculate about each others psychology." </I><BR/><BR/>First, if you took my comments as being speculations about the psychology of (some) philosophers of science as you suggest, I'm afraid you have completely misunderstood them. All I was saying is that some philosophers of science seem to think of themselves as engaged in an activity whose aims and methods are closer to those of science than those of philosophy. This is a point about their metaphilosophical assumptions not their psychology. Evidence for this "insight" is, for example, given by your post and subsequent comments in which you seem to suggest that analytical metaphysics is somehow different in its aims and methods from what you or people who work in those philosophical disciplines that you respect do. But, since you are clearly interested in some of the same questions as analytic metaphysicians, I take it that the difference you perceive between what they do and what you do is a difference of method. But how is analytic metaphysics different methodologically from other areas of philosophy you do not seem to "disdain"? I gather from your comment that one of the disciplnes you seem to take to be methodologically "respectable" is ethics (maybe I'm wrong, if I am could you give me another example?), but, as far as I can see, ethicists rarely provide empirical evidence for their claims. Most of ethics like most of philosophy seems to be based on arguments, whose premises are either supported by other arguments or by our <I>a priori</I> intuitions. If the methodology of ethics differs from that of analytic metaphysics, what is the difference? If they don't, why do you consider one a more methodologically sound activity then the other?<BR/><BR/>Now, you may say "But metaphysics is supposedly telling us what the world is like ethics is not". This may be true if you assume that methaetical antirealism is right. But, if this is the case, what are your arguments for it going to rely on?<BR/><BR/>Finally, you say you are a naturalist. But what does that mean? Does it mean that you think that philosophers should take the findings of science seriously? If so, you are hardly going to find many philosophers even among analytic metaphysicians who disagree with you. Do you think that philosophy should not go beyond mapping the theories that are underdetermined by empirical evidence? If so, you seem to disagree substantially with most of your fellow philosophers whether they do ethics or analytical metaphysics. Do you think that we are epistemically justified in preferring some theories to others when they are empirically underdetermined by the evidence? Since I take you to be a scientific realist, I would expect you to answer "yes", but then on what basis do you think we can do so? And, if you say "no", what exactly makes you a scientific realist? <BR/><BR/><I>"Finally, where on earth do you get the idea that philosophy of science is isolated and fragmented? It seems to me that the subject is in rude health with lots of great work being done and strong links with both particular sciences and the rest of philosophy."</I> <BR/><BR/>Well, I guess that we disagree on the state of the discipline. If you don't see how PhiSci today is more internally fragmented and plays a more marginal role within philosophy than at the time when the likes of Carnap, Neurath, Popper, Hempel, and Quine were around, then I don't know how to persuade you. You may be one of those who think that we do better PhiSci today (and I agree that <I>a whole lot</I> of good PhiSci is being done these days), but certainly philosophy of science is not nearly as unified and central a discipline as it used to be in those days and I think that philosophers of science are the worse off for this. I hope that one day, when the post-Kuhnian rebound we are still experiencing will be finally over, philosophers of science will relearn how to engage with other close areas of analytic philosophy such as metaphysics and epistemology in a critical but constructive manner rather than dismissing them on the basis of some alleged methodological difference. It is only then, I believe, that PhiSci will regain its status as one of the core areas of analytic philosophy.Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-59533415104494843252009-03-21T07:45:00.000-04:002009-03-21T07:45:00.000-04:00Gabriele I at least am still reading this and want...Gabriele I at least am still reading this and want to reply to a couple of your points.<BR/><BR/>I really don't think philosophers of science should refrain from criticizing what they sincerely believe to be a deleterious trend in philosophy because that might make it harder for other philosophers of science to get jobs, because (a) it won't and (b) because we are supposed to follow the argument where it leads and not to avoid drawing conclusions that are uncomfortable. Frankly I find your claim that the likes of me should not criticize parts of philosophy we object to for instrumental reasons to be antithetical to nature of philosophy and academic discourse generally. Various of your posts suggest that your view is that philosophers of science need to engage with analytic metaphysics because the practitioners of the latter are important and powerful in the subject and we don't want to upset them. My view is that since they are so important and powerful in the subject it is particularly important that we question whether their influence good for the subject (and by all means engage with them too).<BR/><BR/>You imply that naturalistically inclined philosophers such as myself are in denial about the fact that we are philosophers employed in philosophy departments not scientists. You offer no evidence for this insight. I attend my department's seminars on ethics and political philosophy and retain a strong interest in all areas of the subject and its history as I said in my original post. I have contributed to the teaching of many area of the subject including giving lectures on Descartes. Your allegation is way off. It is because I self identify as a philosopher that I care so much about how the subject develops.<BR/><BR/>Please let's stick to the issues and not speculate about each others psychology.<BR/><BR/>Finally, where on earth do you get the idea that philosophy of science is isolated and fragmented? It seems to me that the subject is in rude health with lots of great work being done and strong links with both particular sciences and the rest of philosophy.James Ladymanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18193668750711491266noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-75984995823068889362009-03-21T01:39:00.000-04:002009-03-21T01:39:00.000-04:00I don't know if anyone is still following this thr...I don't know if anyone is still following this thread, but I just wanted to clarify my March 8 comment in light of Craig's reply.<BR/><BR/>Craig wrote:<BR/><I>You point out that this kind of reasoning goes on all the time in science, too. [...] I think it's a good point, and it's an important one to make. But I want to warn that differences that exist only in degree are still differences. Red and blue differ only in degree, but they're different colors. Same here. Your point, pushed to its logical limits, makes virtually everything methodologically the same."</I><BR/><BR/>Craig, of course, I'm not claiming that differences of degree are not differences. What strikes me as incongruous in James' post and in some of the subsequent comments is not the fact that they seem to ignore that the difference is a difference of degree between analytic metaphysics and, say, some philosophy of physics but rather the fact that the disdain expressed for analytic metaphysics does not seem to be proportioned to the degree to which it differs from philosophy of physics. In other words, given the degree to which the two activities differ, I cannot see how one can engage in one and "despise" the other. <BR/><BR/>As much as some philosophers of science may not like it, what they are doing is not science--it is philosophy--and this is why most of them are on the payrolls of philosophy departments. Part of the reason why philosophy of science is so isolated and fragmented these days, I suspect, is that many philosophers of science don't seem to be able to come to terms with the fact that they are <I>philosophers</I> of science. <BR/><BR/>Beside the metaphilosophical worries, this has very serious practical consequences. The less philosophy of science is seen as a lively area <I>of philosophy</I>, for example, the less there will be jobs for philosophers of science because a philosophy department will rather hire someone who considers herself a philosophers rather than someone that think of herselves as, say, having much more in common with the theoretical physicist on the other side of campus than with philosophers in their department. And the fewer the jobs for philosophers of science, the fewer the PhD students that will be ready to go into philosophy of science. So, I think it would be advisable for philosophers of science should at least try not to engage in public displays of contempt for philosophy and its methodology, if only for purely instrumental reasons.<BR/><BR/>(Incidentally, your claim that my point makes "virtually everything methodologically the same" strikes me as an hyperbole. As far as I can see, nothing in what I say makes, say, palmistry, soothsaying or wishful thinking methodologically have the same methodology as science or philosophy.)Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-34319092866696097492009-03-11T12:43:00.000-04:002009-03-11T12:43:00.000-04:00I agree with what Craig said above, but I would pu...I agree with what Craig said above, but I would put most of Lewis's well-known work toward the happy/sciency end of the methodological spectrum.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-18324403770159717062009-03-11T11:37:00.000-04:002009-03-11T11:37:00.000-04:00I'd ask "Why draw such a line?" That's to say, why...I'd ask "Why draw such a line?" That's to say, why assume that there's one specific line that's appropriate for each and every inquirer?<BR/><BR/>Don't we just want an appropriate distribution of workers along the spectrum, e.g. more at the empirical end and less at the other?Darrell Rowbottomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17789414374258070028noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-83674659760802125402009-03-10T21:58:00.000-04:002009-03-10T21:58:00.000-04:00Craig has just beaten me to the punch somewhat, so...Craig has just beaten me to the punch somewhat, so I’ll merely second his points that true enough the differences here are only differences in degree – and yet therefore are still differences. As it were, there is a spectrum from the purer armchair end of metaphysics to the more applied areas of science. I think we all share sufficiently the same set of background beliefs, in particular a respect for modern science, to construct roughly the same ordering along this spectrum for strength (or directness) of empirical constraint.<BR/><BR/>Then, as Craig implied, one can imagine going to the ‘other end’ of that spectrum from science, past current metaphysics, to something like apocryphal investigations of angels on pinheads. It seems to me that such angelic investigations would also be different from science and mainstream metaphysics only as a matter of degree.<BR/><BR/>I do NOT mean thereby to imply that current metaphysics is no more respectable than angels on pinheads. Rather, only that we all must have, implicitly or explicitly, some sort of ‘respectability function’ concerning where to draw the line, i.e. how far along the spectrum we think that inquiry remains worthwhile and spouses and children can be faced without shame. The nearer the science end of the spectrum I am, the safer I feel.<BR/><BR/>But where exactly to place the line (or fade-out region)? As with many ethical issues, I have my own opinions about that but I’m not sure to what extent reason alone will persuade those who differ. (I imagine a few scientists might want to draw it in such a place as to rule out almost all of philosophy altogether.)Robert Northcotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01117032852447718250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-65993891964472758562009-03-10T19:26:00.000-04:002009-03-10T19:26:00.000-04:00Dear Gabriele,Thanks for the thoughts on the post....Dear Gabriele,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for the thoughts on the post. I think that in one sense you're right and another wrong. I pointed out that "testing" a physical or metaphysical proposition – no two things can occupy the same place and time – against our concepts of "thing" "Siamese twin" and so forth seemed to imply one thinks one has a pre-Kantian rationalist faculty. You point out that this kind of reasoning goes on all the time in science, too. For consider two theories T1 and T2 that make distinct clams about the world yet are empirically distinguishable. Then if I was a scientific realist I might prefer T2 to T1 on the basis of "a priori" theoretical virtues. Isn't this the same, you ask, differing only in degree?<BR/><BR/>Now the realist might have some responses, e.g., inductive support for the theoretical virtues, but let’s grant the point.<BR/><BR/>I think it's a good point, and it's an important one to make. But I want to warn that differences that exist only in degree are still differences. Red and blue differ only in degree, but they're different colors. Same here. Your point, pushed to its logical limits, makes virtually everything methodologically the same. Suppose one thinks that the observable-unobservable distinction is fuzzy, that Churchland's response to van Frassen in the 80's was basically right (I think it is). Then the strictly speaking observable goes to the vanishingly small. Forget about the underdetermination of theory by data in quantum mechanics. It's all underdetermined virtually all the way down. Not only don't we know whether Everett or Bohm is right, but whether there is a coffee cup in front of me is underdetermined too! The "observables" are compatible with me being a brain in a vat. Given this, is it all just a brute pushing back and forth of intuitions?<BR/><BR/>In one sense I guess, yes. Science is ridden with interpretation through and through. But still we have these categories, 'evidence', 'test', 'empirical support', 'confirmation', and so on. Using these and our build-up stock of interpretations, it seems to me that the difference is huge between testing a fundamental empirical claim by conformity with our concept of a macro-level type of twin and testing it via (say) the Cavendish experiment. A difference in degree, okay, but a huge difference nonetheless.Craig Callenderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14508538792066172321noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-23153079839059075042009-03-10T14:14:00.000-04:002009-03-10T14:14:00.000-04:00I agree with James that the omission of Carnap fro...I agree with James that the omission of Carnap from the list is a big mistake, but mistakes of that sort are inevitable in silly VH1-type top 100s.<BR/><BR/>As for Lewis, I'm surprised to see philosophers of science criticizing his legacy, which left us one of the best accounts of laws of nature, as well as a fantastic discussion of the definition of theoretical terms. Not everything the guy wrote was pure gold, but a lot of it was.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-90507935915551501042009-03-08T21:23:00.000-04:002009-03-08T21:23:00.000-04:00James: "Or perhaps someone can explain to me why I...James: "<I>Or perhaps someone can explain to me why I should care, for example, how many regions of spacetime there are, and why I should think it is the job of philosophers to speculate about such matters.</I>"<BR/><BR/>If there are not enough regions, then "nominalizing" mathematicized physical theories may be harder (unless one goes modal). If every mathematical entity assumed by a physical theory T can be coded as a physical entity (e.g., a region), then one can reduce T to a "nominalistic" theory N such that T is conservative over N (for "nominalistic" statements). Burgess and Rosen 1997, <I>A Subject with No Object</I> have a good discussion of such matters.<BR/><BR/>(I say "nominalistic" in quotes because even a <I>theory</I> is an abstract entity. After all, nominalism is itself an abstract entity - a proposition, which asserts its own non-existence, and is therefore untrue.)Jeffrey Ketlandhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01753975411670884721noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-11404950420991566152009-03-08T00:02:00.000-05:002009-03-08T00:02:00.000-05:00Craig,As a father of two, I cannot but sympathize ...Craig,<BR/><BR/>As a father of two, I cannot but sympathize with some of the feelings you express in your comment and some of the questions you raise. What I find surprising though is that you seem to assume that, to your son, the philosophical questions you actually work on will appear much more legitimate and worthwhile than the one on which you feel you have wasted your afternoon in London. As far as I can see, given the level of specialization of contemporary analytic philosophy, the kinds of questions most philosophers work on would seem quite abstruse, uninteresting, and ultimately unimportant (especially in a world in which billions of people live under the poverty line and/or are affected by HIV/AIDS and/or do not have access to clean drinking water). (I don't think this is a problem only for philosophers though. I guess few people can look their children in the eyes after a day of work and be confident that the time they have spent away from them was spent doing something that is more worthwhile or relevant to humanity than spending time with them and this is probably why most people see their work as having instrumental and not intrinsic value--i.e. they work to earn a living, become rich, or become successful, or ...). Moreover, if anything, I suspect, if pressed, most non-philosophers would consider questions about personal identity (which I take it is what the question of the twins was ultimately about) more relevant to their philosophical concerns than, say, questions about, say, the time reversal invariance of classical mechanics (and believe me this is not meant to be an <I>ad hominem</I> point--I find the latter question quite interesting myself).<BR/><BR/>The other assumption that I find puzzling is that, despite your acknowledging that the line between metaphysics and science, if there is one, is a fine one, you still seem to assume, much like James in his original post, that there is a methodological difference between "good" and "bad" metaphysics. This is a theme that has reemerged throughout this thread and I cannot but repeat what Antony expressed so well in his comment above--i.e. methodologically, philosophers seem to be all on the same boat. They can map the logical space of possible thesis one can hold with respect to a certain topic and offer arguments for and against some of them. Some of the premises of these arguments might be supported by empirical evidence but I cannot see how to do philosophy without <I>any</I> appeal to <I>a priori</I> considerations and in particular to our intuitions (e.g. the seeming assumption that, <I>ceteris paribus</I>, simpler theories are more likely to be true than complex ones). <BR/><BR/>Now, some philosophers of science (usually those very philosophers of science who practice the kind of philosophy of physics whose questions sound so dangerously similar to those addressed by the metaphysics they find so abhorrent) seem to think of themselves as being involved in a more methodologically-sound enterprise then other fellow philosophers. This, I suspect, is due to the fact that they see themselves as working with the following general pattern of argument in the background:<BR/><BR/>(1) If theory T is true, then metaphysical thesis P is true.<BR/>(2) (Empirical evidence suggests that) theory T is true.<BR/>(C) (Empirical evidence suggests that) metaphysical thesis P is true.<BR/><BR/>and that they take (2) to be established empirically and (1) to be only innocuously <I>a priori</I> (it is a question of conceptual analysis of theory T).<BR/><BR/>But, of course, this is not the case. First, (2) is not established by empirical evidence. Many scientific anti-realists deny (2) without denying any of the empirical evidence that supports the theory. So, our philosopher of physics would seem to need at least an argument for scientific realism and as far as I can see most arguments for scientific realism require some appeal to our <I>a priori</I> intuitions (e.g. about the low likelyhood of a completely false theory being highly empirically successful). <BR/><BR/>Second, the seemingly innocuous <I>a priori</I> conceptual analysis of the theory is in fact an <I>interpretation</I> of the empirically successful theory, which fills in the metaphysical details, which most working scientists have neither the patience nor the inclination to fill in and that is no more supported by the evidence than any other possible interpretation of it and, in some cases, it is an interpretation of only one of various alternative, empirically equivalent theories that have completely different metaphysical implications (e.g. Bohmian mecahnics and GRW in the case of QM).<BR/><BR/>So can the empirical success of QM tell us what the world is like from a metaphysical point of view? As far as I can see, the answer is 'No'. At most the empirical success of QM puts a number of constraints on what combination of beliefs whether metaphysical or not one can coherently hold in the face of it. Part of what philosophers of physics do, then, seems to be just mapping the logical space of the possible combinations of beliefs (just like the metaphysicians they so despise do). And most philosophers of physics don't seem to stop at that--some seem to think that some of these combinations of of beliefs are preferable to others and not only on the grounds that some are better supported by all of our other best scientific theories but also because of the unattractiveness of certain assumptions. I don't know how to interpret many of those arguments for or against some of these combinations of beliefs if not as appeals to our intuitions about their <I>a priori</I> plausibility. <BR/><BR/>In light of all this, I can only see a difference in degree not in kind between the two activities and some of the feelings expressed in this thread seem to be disproportionate to the real difference between them.Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-17454547332576584992009-03-07T05:25:00.000-05:002009-03-07T05:25:00.000-05:00Yes, Gabriele, I like that way of putting it. And ...Yes, Gabriele, I like that way of putting it. And I still don't think scientists, as it were, "merely" account for things. They explain things in precisely the sense of treating them as contingent facts.<BR/><BR/>I was reacting to the idea that "trying to come up with simple and explanatory powerful theories of a certain set of phenomena [is methodologically like] what (theoretical) scientists do."<BR/><BR/>Since metaphysical "facts" are (presumably) necessary, and since science explains contingent facts, metaphysics and science are very different intellectual activties. Science accounts for the contingency of a fact (like the glass being the same one that was there five minutes ago); metaphysics accounts for its necessity.<BR/><BR/>Again, I should admit that I sometimes find myself engaging in metaphysical speculation, but normally the question of accounting the persistence (as such) of a fact that is in fact persisting (rather than perishing through some physical process) leaves me a bit cold.<BR/><BR/>Sometimes someone does raise an interesting puzzle of that kind in a particular context. It's usually quickly resolved, however, with a bit of "language therapy".Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04858865501469168339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-26831443449369120692009-03-07T05:23:00.000-05:002009-03-07T05:23:00.000-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04858865501469168339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-39680285669393705682009-03-07T00:53:00.000-05:002009-03-07T00:53:00.000-05:00I think Chris Hitchcock is spot on with his diagno...I think Chris Hitchcock is spot on with his diagnosis. Let me elaborate on this via a personal anecdote…<BR/><BR/>When I lived in London the journal Mind, ever desperate for help, put me on its editorial committee. That meant trudging up to UCL every other Monday to discuss papers. All in all, it was a great experience; certainly I learned a lot. People would report on papers and we would discuss them. Sometimes particular papers would monopolize a meeting. One that left a lasting impression was a meeting devoted to this question: *do Siamese twins constitute a counter-example to Locke's principle that no two things can occupy the same place and same time?* For what seemed like hours we went back-and-forth on this question of deep concern to a sub-area of philosophy.<BR/><BR/>"What did you do today?" my wife asked when I returned home. My stomach turned. I then looked at my newborn son. His father had just spent the better part of a workday trying to discern the fundamental structure of the world by reflecting on the existence of Siamese twins. So had ten to twenty other philosophers. A combined 50-100 years of training had taken place so that a bunch of grown men (alas, yes, mostly men) could debate the metaphysics of Siamese twins. And this being the UK, they were paid by the State. How could I look myself in the mirror after this? Or tell my family what I did? My son, when grown up a bit, would have to lie to teachers and classmates when explaining what I did.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps there are ways of construing this question in a manner that isn't methodologically abhorrent. Maybe – to pick up on Chris' comments – it's really about regimenting language use. Then the question's only sin is being a bit esoteric and possibly boring. Or maybe it's a question inspired by legal and ethical matters, e.g., should Siamese twins be required to get two drivers licenses or merely one? Not obvious; but clearly this is a genuine question -- if only for six (or twelve?) drivers in the world. <BR/><BR/>Advertised as metaphysics, however, it's hard not to construe the participants of this debate as engaged in a pursuit that can only be interpreted as implying that they believe they have the spooky pre-Kantian rationalist powers mentioned by Chris. Locke's principle that no two things can occupy the same time/place is held up as a claim about the objective causal structure of the world, on par with –nay, in one sense stronger than—Lorentz symmetry, the Pauli Exclusion Principle, and so on. Then instead of testing it empirically – e.g., in the Lorenztian case, say, by shooting rotating interferometers up in space or such-- we "test" it by thinking about the notions of "thing", "same" and "Siamese twin". Special parts of our brain (innate or learned, I don't know) are activated and connect the structure of the world to our concepts. When all is clearly and distinctly perceived, we have a result! Maybe we should test Lorentz symmetry just by thinking about it too (or general covariance too – whoops, bad example! Don't get me going on GC here). Anyway, a bunch of questions like the one mentioned seem to be enthusiastically pursued of late, and for many of them it's very hard to reconstruct a methodological rationale that is plausible. <BR/><BR/>That criticism leaves all sorts of metaphysics standing tall. Regimenting language (e.g., via logical analysis) can be enormously fruitful. I regularly teach Sobel's dissection of the fatalist argument. Seeing fatalism being demolished this way and that is really impressive and a tremendous service to undergrads looking for a priori excuses for laziness. And of course, science is loaded with metaphysics from top to bottom, e.g., is spacetime discrete or continuous, relational or substantival, and so on. It's famously difficult (impossible?) to draw any neat line between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical. That shouldn't stop us from our metaphysical pursuits, but neither should it provide cover for the pre-Kantian rationalists among us. The reason James' post has struck a nerve, I submit, is that many sense this specter has arisen from the ash heap of history.Craig Callenderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14508538792066172321noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-31244635085840628362009-03-06T14:23:00.000-05:002009-03-06T14:23:00.000-05:00For me one of the greatest philosophers of the twe...For me one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century was Karl Popper, but I like other philosophers not considered as the "greatest" (like C.J.Ducasse).<BR/><BR/>A most interesting question would be: "<B>what do you think is the greatest of the current or contemporary philosophers</B>"? It will give us elements for a more interesting discussion. <BR/> <BR/>Jime<BR/>(A non-professional philosopher, but someone who loves philosophy!)Jimehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12817742150756784876noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-71219702471098867282009-03-06T14:04:00.000-05:002009-03-06T14:04:00.000-05:00Thomas,I see--you take only contingent facts to be...Thomas,<BR/><BR/>I see--you take only contingent facts to be explainable. What if instead of "explain", I used "account for". Don't you agree that what some metaphysicians are trying to do is to account for the seeming persistence of some object through time? And don't you think that some of these accounts are better than others?Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-70471685746469636282009-03-06T13:54:00.000-05:002009-03-06T13:54:00.000-05:00Matteo,In his comment on March 5 at 6:01am, James ...Matteo,<BR/><BR/>In his comment on March 5 at 6:01am, James seems to consider that the crucial difference between "metaphysical" and "scientific" underdetermination. My point is exactly that I do not see any way to "extract" the metaphysics directly from our best theories and that when James thinks he is doing that he is in fact doing what analytic metaphysicians do.<BR/><BR/>Btw I hope many of you attended Larry Sklar's exceptionally interesting presidential address at the PSA08, as Sklar was making exactly the same point although much more clearly and forcefully than I would ever be able to do!Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-1963108342606118752009-03-06T12:45:00.000-05:002009-03-06T12:45:00.000-05:00James, I think the analogy you draw between identi...James, <BR/><BR/>I think the analogy you draw between identity in mathematics and in physics is not sufficiently worked out. What *scientific practice* tells you that quantum indiscernibles should be attributed contextual primitive identity but not intrinsic primitive identity? Doesn't the whole move rest on the *metaphysical* presupposition that intrinsic primitive identities entail the violation of permutation invariance because they entail some unpleasant form of haecceitism?<BR/><BR/>Gabriele,<BR/><BR/>I don't think James is committed to the claim that unlike analytic metaphysics naturalized metaphysics predicts novel phenomena. He just thinks that answers to certain questions transcending science are meaningful only if based on the empirical facts studied by science.<BR/><BR/>I think the key point is whether metaphysics can be directly 'extracted' by scientific theories and practice or just needs to be 'fleshed out' by looking at science after having done most of the conceptual work. James seems to opt for the former option, I would favour the latter on the basis that the tools, concepts and categories needed for interpretation cannot be found within the theory to be interpreted.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-60881030208157471632009-03-06T12:24:00.000-05:002009-03-06T12:24:00.000-05:00James,"Hannes Leitgeb and I argue for primitive co...James,<BR/><BR/><I>"Hannes Leitgeb and I argue for primitive contextual identity and individuality for mathematical objects on the basis of reflections about mathematical practice"</I><BR/><BR/>I'm not sure I see why "mathematical practice" should provide evidence for one view of identity over the others. Is it because you take the <I>a priori</I> intuitions of mathematicsians to be more reliable than those of metaphysicians or because you take mathematics to be an empirical science?<BR/><BR/>Moreover, if our scientific theories are underdetermined by our evidence, our metaphysical theories seem to be even more so (I took that to be your original concern). So, I assume you are not claiming that, say, primitive identity is the only view that is compatible with the empirical evidence. But if you don't, it would seem that you would either have to suspend your judgment over any underdetermined alternative (either scientific or metaphysical) or you would have to concede that <I>a priori</I> considerations carry some epistemic weight in both domains. In any case, most of what you said seems to support my earlier claim that metaphysics and science are not as methodologically different as you were suggesting in your post and previous comments, because, as far as I can see, what you are in fact doing is not in any way methodologically different from what most analytic metaphysicians do except that you try to make it sound more respectable by giving it a more scientific gloss.<BR/><BR/>In particular, in your earlier comments you were suggesting that the methodology of the analytic metaphysics differs from the methodology of science in that metaphysical theories do not lead to the prediction of novel phenomena. I already say why I disagree with you on that, but even if you were not convinced by my earlier arguments, I cannot see how the naturalized metaphysics you practice is better than analytic metaphysics on that score. If you disagree with my argument above, could you explain me which <I>novel</I> phenomena are predicted by someone who believes in primitive identities over haecceities?Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-11163886600833174802009-03-06T03:28:00.000-05:002009-03-06T03:28:00.000-05:00GabrieleHannes Leitgeb and I argue for primitive c...Gabriele<BR/><BR/>Hannes Leitgeb and I argue for primitive contextual identity and individuality for mathematical objects on the basis of reflections about mathematical practice, and John Stachel, Simon Saunders and I argue for contextual identity for quantum particles and spacetime points on the basis of the way the relevant theories describe the world. So no conflict between my posts because I have always said that I am interested in metaphysical issues that connect with the science and in attempting to answer them in the light of our best science rather than on the basis of intuitions or their distinctively metaphysical explanatory power. So I advocate doing naturalized metaphysics and while some contemporary metaphysicians do look to science, I think that on the whole the subject is not sufficiently naturalistic hence my complaint.<BR/><BR/><BR/>spacetime points and quantum particles becauseJames Ladymanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18193668750711491266noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-34212177923347252562009-03-05T23:18:00.000-05:002009-03-05T23:18:00.000-05:00James,In this post, you say you have "disdain" for...James,<BR/><BR/>In this post, you say you have "disdain" for contemporary analytic metaphysics, and find its questions and methodology largely "ridiculous" but then I find you over <A HREF="http://substantialmatters.blogspot.com/2009/03/haecceities-are-primitive-identities-in.html" REL="nofollow">here</A> seemingly arguing for the superiority of primitive identity over haecceities (!?!). Is it just a case of homonymy or am I missing something? I must admit I'm quite puzzled! ;-)Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264125276161269122.post-22695754414824038082009-03-05T21:54:00.000-05:002009-03-05T21:54:00.000-05:00I think it's worth noting that people who practice...I think it's worth noting that people who practice analytic Metaphysics have been lately concerned with methodological issues. There is even a word for that kind of discussion, "meta-metaphysics". For example, some people have proposed that the debate about whether arbitrary sums of simple are genuine objects, one Ladyman’s last post cites, is misconceived; it's only a verbal dispute. <BR/><BR/> In a sense, this still tells in favor of the initial worries. If the question whether there are genuine issues seems so pressing, it must be because the issues themselves invite that question. There is however a risk of representing people engaged in analytic Metaphysics unfairly, as if they were proceeding under the unquestioned assumption of being debating substantial questions with the appropriate methods. On the contrary, these concerns have been taken seriously and have prompted quite a lot of published discussion. It proves very hard, for example, to say exactly what it means for a question to be merely verbal. It often turns out however that to take a stand of this meta-questions, requires taking a stand on the object level question, as some previous posts, I think, show.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com